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VOTING FOR BALANCE: THE THIRD 
CIRCUIT SPLITS WITH THE SIXTH 
CIRCUIT OVER THE PRESS’S RIGHT TO 
ACCESS POLLING STATIONS IN PG 
PUBLISHING CO. v. AICHELE 
Abstract: In 2013, in PG Publishing Co. v. Aichele, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit applied the experience and logic test to the voting process, 
contradicting the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s previous applica-
tion of a traditional forum analysis to the voting process in its 2004 Beacon 
Journal Publishing Co. v. Blackwell decision. This Comment argues that the ex-
perience and logic test properly balances the government’s interest in privacy 
against the public’s interest in access to information. In contrast, applying a tradi-
tional forum analysis to the right of access creates the potential for the govern-
ment to hide behind a veil of secrecy. 
INTRODUCTION 
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution confers the right of free-
dom of press.1 Courts, however, have disagreed over the scope of this right—
specifically, whether the press’s right of access extends to polling places dur-
ing elections.2 In 2013, in PG Publishing Co. v. Aichele (PG II), the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit examined the constitutionality of a provision 
of the Pennsylvania Election Code that mandated that all persons, except elec-
tions officials and voters, remain at least ten feet from polling places.3 The 
Third Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the provision, reasoning that the 
                                                                                                                           
 1 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”); see 
also James R. Ferguson, Government Secrecy After the Cold War: The Role of Congress, 34 B.C. L. 
REV. 451, 476 (1993) (discussing the importance of the press’s Constitutional protections). Under the 
First Amendment, the freedom of press includes a qualified right to access information. See Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U.S. 829, 832 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (plurality opin-
ion). 
 2 See PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele (PG II), 705 F.3d 91, 112 (3d Cir. 2013); Beacon Journal Publ’g 
Co. v. Blackwell, 389 F.3d 683, 685 (6th Cir. 2004). The right of access in this context means the right 
to access information and gather news. See PG II, 705 F.3d at 98. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in 
its 1974 decision in Pell v. Procunier, the right of freedom of the press safeguards the public interest 
in the free flow of information. See 417 U.S. at 832. 
 3 705 F.3d at 94; see 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3060(d) (West 2014). 
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First Amendment’s right of access did not extend to the voting process.4 In so 
holding, the Third Circuit split with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit’s 2004 decision in Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Blackwell.5 In 
Beacon Journal, the Sixth Circuit held that an Ohio statute that prohibited ac-
cess to a polling station— except for officials and voters—abridged the press’s 
right of free speech.6 
This Comment examines why the Third Circuit’s analysis and ultimate 
ruling is superior to that of the Sixth Circuit’s.7 In Part I, this Comment juxta-
poses the right of free speech with the right of access, and also examines the 
procedural history of PG II.8 Part II then compares and analyzes the Third Cir-
cuit’s ruling in PG II with the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Beacon Journal.9 Final-
ly, Part III argues that the Third Circuit’s framework for evaluating the consti-
tutionality of a law restricting access to the voting process is a more sensible 
analysis than the Sixth Circuit’s approach.10 Part III justifies this conclusion by 
demonstrating that the experience and logic test—that the Third Circuit em-
ployed—properly accounts for both tradition and the public’s contemporane-
ous role in the functioning of the challenged process.11 
I. ANALYZING THE RIGHT OF ACCESS VERSUS THE RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH 
This Part examines the two distinctive constitutional tests used to evaluate 
whether one’s freedom of speech or one’s right to access information has been 
abridged.12 Each right prompts a different mode of analysis: a traditional fo-
rum analysis is attached to free speech, while a balancing test is used to deter-
                                                                                                                           
 4 See PG II, 705 F.3d at 112. 
 5 389 F.3d at 684. The disputed Ohio statute at issue in Beacon Journal mandated that “no person 
shall . . . loiter [or] congregate” near the polling place and “no person . . . shall be allowed to enter the 
polling place during the election, except for the purpose of voting.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3501.35 
(West 2002); see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3501.35(B)(1) (West 2014) (providing the current version 
of § 3501.35). 
 6 See 389 F.3d at 685. 
 7 See infra notes 12–85 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 12–43 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 44–67 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 68–85 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 68–85 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 13–43 and accompanying text (detailing the two tests). The U.S. Supreme Court 
has firmly recognized that the First Amendment—in addition to the protection of free of speech and 
the press—provides a qualified protection for newsgathering activity. See Pell, 417 U.S at 832; 
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681 (plurality opinion). In 1972, in Branzburg v. Hayes, a plurality of the U.S. 
Supreme Court acknowledged that, “without some [First Amendment] protection for seeking out the 
news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.” 408 U.S. at 681. The Court noted, however, that the 
press’s right to access information, like the public’s right, is not absolute. See id. at 684; Donna Mac-
Kenzie, Note, Do Democracies Die Behind Closed Doors? The Third and Sixth Circuits Split Over the 
Closure of Removal Hearings, 49 WAYNE L. REV. 813, 824 (2003) (stating that public’s right to access 
is not absolute). 
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mine one’s right of access.13 Because the Sixth and Third Circuits disagreed on 
which right was at stake in the state statutes that banned access to polling sta-
tions, each court used a different test leading to dissimilar results.14 According-
ly, Section A explicates these contrasting standards.15 Then, Section B details 
the procedural history of PG II.16 
A. Different Modes of Analysis: Evaluating the Freedom of Speech  
Versus the Right of Access 
When evaluating the right to free speech, courts use a traditional forum 
analysis by applying different standards depending on whether the speech reg-
ulation is in a public or nonpublic forum.17 In public fora—places which tradi-
tionally, or as designated by government order, “have been devoted to assem-
bly and debate”—courts sharply circumscribe a state’s right to limit expressive 
activity.18 In both “traditional” and “designated” public fora, content-based 
restrictions on speech are subject to strict scrutiny.19 Accordingly, a content-
based restriction on speech in a public forum must be narrowly drawn to serve 
a compelling state interest.20 In nonpublic fora—places dedicated solely to the 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See PG II, 705 F.3d at 99–100 (explaining that courts use a traditional framework analysis 
when evaluating issues of free speech); id. at 102 (stating that courts use a balancing test to evaluate 
the right of access to information). 
 14 Compare id. at 108 (employing the experience and logic test), with Beacon Journal, 389 F.3d at 
685 (employing a traditional forum analysis). 
 15 See infra notes 17–30 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 31–43 and accompanying text. 
 17 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001) (discussing the stand-
ard for evaluating restricting access to nonpublic fora); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ 
Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44–46 (1983) (discussing the difference between public and nonpublic fora); PG 
II, 705 F.3d at 99–100 (explaining when the traditional forum analysis is used). 
 18 See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726–27 (1990) (explaining that strict scrutiny 
applies to regulation of speech on government property “that has been traditionally open to the public 
for expressive activity” and to property “expressly dedicated by the Government to speech activity”); 
Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S at 45 (“For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show 
that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to 
achieve that end.”); see also Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (concluding 
that the use of public places for expression is a part of citizens’ privileges and immunities). 
 19 See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 721; Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45; PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele 
(PG I), 902 F. Supp. 2d 724, 749 (W.D. Pa. 2012). A restriction on speech satisfies strict scrutiny only 
if it is “necessary to serve a compelling state interest” and is “narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” 
Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45. 
 20 See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S at 45; see also Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) (explaining that regulating speech on “on the basis of its 
subject matter” transitions a regulation from a neutral law to one concerned with content). Moreover, 
if the government attempts to regulate the time, place and manner of speech, rather than preventing the 
speech, such a regulation must be content-neutral and leave open alternative channels of communication. 
See PG I, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 749. For example, in 1992, in Burson v. Freeman, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that a Tennessee statute, which prohibited the solicitation of votes and the display of distri-
bution of campaign materials within 100 feet of the entrance of polling places, was content-based. See 
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discussion of certain subjects or places that only certain groups can utilize for 
speech—a state has more authority to regulate speech.21 Restrictions on a 
speaker’s access to a nonpublic forum need only be reasonable and viewpoint 
neutral.22 Regardless of the nature of the forum, a regulation cannot be view-
point based, that is, the speaker’s “specific motivating ideology” cannot form 
the basis of the restriction on speech.23 
In contrast, evaluating the right to access information involves a balanc-
ing test—the “experience and logic test” test—to determine the appropriate 
level of scrutiny.24 In 1980, in the U.S. Supreme Court’s case Richmond News-
papers, Inc. v. Virginia, Justice William Brennan concurred in the judgment 
and articulated this test as the framework for evaluating whether the press has 
the right to access information about government processes.25 The experience 
and logic test balances the interests of the public in observing and monitoring 
government functions against both the government’s interest (and the long-
standing historical practice) in keeping certain information from public scruti-
                                                                                                                           
504 U.S. 191, 197 (1992). Still, the Court upheld the statute because it served a significant govern-
ment interest in protecting the fundamental right to vote and it left open alternative avenues for free 
speech to occur. See id. at 199–200. 
 21 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106–07; Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 721; PG I, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 
749. 
 22 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106–07. 
 23 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (explaining that 
speech regulation that targets a particular viewpoint violates the First Amendment). 
 24 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S 566, 597–98 (1980). The “experience and 
logic test” is also referred to as the “Richmond Newspapers Test.” See PG II, 705 F.3d at 103. In 1972, 
in the U.S. Supreme Court case Branzburg v. Hayes, Justice Powell announced the need for such a 
balancing test in his concurring opinion. 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). In Branzburg, a 
reporter claimed that testifying before a grand jury about confidential sources would violate his right 
to gather news. See id. at 667 (plurality opinion). The Court engaged in a balancing inquiry, weighing 
the freedom of the press against the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to 
criminal conduct, and ultimately held that the press was required to give relevant testimony. See id. at 
682 (explaining the balancing test); id. at 709 (announcing the holding). Justice Powell reasoned that 
balancing “these vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried 
and traditional way of adjudicating such questions.” Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). In 1974, in Pell v. 
Procunier, the Court engaged in a similar balancing test—balancing the security of prisons against the 
press’s right to gather news—to decide whether to uphold a California Department of Corrections regula-
tion that prohibited the press and others from interviewing specific inmates. See 417 U.S at 829. The 
Court ultimately agreed with the prison’s administrators that the interest in preserving safety and security 
outweighed that of the press’s right to access information, partly based on the fact that the press had an 
alternative means of obtaining this information. See id. at 832–35. 
 25 See 448 U.S at 597–98 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that courts should balance the public’s 
interest in monitoring the government with the state’s interest in keeping certain information private). 
In Richmond Newspapers, reporters sought access to a criminal courtroom that had been closed to the 
public to prevent undue dissemination of witness-related information. See id. at 559–63 (majority opin-
ion); see also Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and Beyond: Considering the Right 
to Know in the Administrative State, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 95, 107–08 (2004) (explaining that 
Justice William Brennan’s concurrence formulates a two step inquiry to analyze the press’s right of 
access). 
2014] PG Publishing Holds Press Does Not Have a Right of Access to Polling Place 187 
ny.26 Under the experience prong, courts consider whether a place and process 
have historically been open to the press and general public.27 Under the logic 
prong, courts objectively assess whether public access plays a significant posi-
tive role in the function of the process in question and whether openness im-
pairs the public good.28 Accordingly, if the experience and logic test reveals 
that a right of access exists, any restraint on that right is then evaluated under 
strict scrutiny.29 It is through this analytical framework that the Third Circuit 
approached PG’s assertions of freedom of access in PG II.30 
B. PG Publishing Company’s Right of Access Claim 
In PG II, the Third Circuit held that PG Publishing Company (“PG”) did 
not have a First Amendment right of access to the voting process.31 PG is the 
                                                                                                                           
 26 See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 597–98 (Brennan, J., concurring) (explaining the bal-
ancing test); PG II, 705 F.3d at 103–04 (same). In two subsequent cases, the Court more fully articu-
lated this balancing framework. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Ca. for Riverside Cnty., 478 
U.S. 1, 8 (1986); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 596, 605–06 
(1982). In 1982, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk County, the U.S. Supreme 
Court granted the press access to criminal trials involving the sexual abuse of underage victims. See 
457 U.S. at 598. Writing for the majority, Justice William Brennan stated that the utility of open crim-
inal trials rested in “both logic and experience.” See id. at 606 (reasoning that the criminal trial had 
historically been open and that the right of access to criminal trials played a significant role in the 
functioning of the judicial process). Similarly, in 1986, in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of 
California for Riverside County, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the right of access to a transcript 
of a preliminary hearing in a criminal trial. See 478 U.S. at 3. The Court held that a right of access 
requires a two-prong evaluation of “whether the place and process have historically been open to the 
press” and “whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular 
process in question.” Id. at 8. 
 27 See Press-Enter. Co., 478 U.S. at 8 (stating that the first prong of the experience and logic test 
evaluates “whether the place and process have historically been open to the press”); N. Jersey Media 
Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 209 (3d Cir. 2009) (applying experience and logic test). 
 28 See Press-Enter. Co., 478 U.S. at 8; PG II, 705 F.3d at 110–11; see also N. Jersey Media Grp., 
308 F.3d at 217 (“[W]ere the logic prong only to determine whether openness serves some good, it is 
difficult to conceive of a government proceeding to which the public would not have a First Amend-
ment right of access.”). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has adopted six broad catego-
ries that are typically served by openness to the public: (1) promotion of informed discussion of gov-
ernmental affairs; (2) promotion of the public perception of fairness; (3) providing a significant com-
munity therapeutic value; (4) serving as a check on corrupt practices; (5) enhancement of the perfor-
mance of all involved; and (6) discouragement of fraud. See United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 839 
(3d Cir. 1994). The PG II court emphasized, however, that these categories are not dispositive in de-
termining the value of openness under the circumstances. See 705 F.3d at 111. Specifically, the court 
explained that, although an open voting process promotes the discussion of government affairs, there 
were not any apparent additional benefits derived from the press being inside the polling place as 
opposed to merely ten feet outside. See id. 
 29 See Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606–07; see also Kitrosser, supra note 25, at 109 (ex-
plaining that a regulation that fails the experience and logic test is presumptively invalid and analyzed 
under strict scrutiny). That is, even if the experience and logic test favors a right of access, the law 
must still stand up under strict scrutiny. See MacKenzie, supra note 12, at 824. 
 30 See PG II, 705 F.3d at 106. 
 31 See id. at 112. 
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publisher of the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, a daily newspaper circulated through-
out western Pennsylvania.32 In light of Pennsylvania’s new restrictive Voter ID 
laws, PG challenged the constitutionality of Section 3060(d) of the Pennsylvania 
Election Code.33 The code mandates that all persons—except election officials 
and voters—remain at least ten feet away from the polling place during the vot-
ing process.34 PG’s complaint alleged that Section 3060(d) infringed on the 
press’s First Amendment right to access and gather news at polling places.35 
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dis-
missed PG’s suit, reasoning that Section 3060(d) is a content-neutral law regu-
lating physical location rather than a person’s speech.36 Applying the tradition-
al forum analysis, the court concluded that a polling place is a nonpublic forum 
and analyzed the statute under the rubric of reasonable and viewpoint neutral 
laws.37 Consequently, the court held that PG’s First Amendment rights were 
not abridged, given that Section 3060(d) is a generally applicable content-
neutral law that protects an individual’s “right to cast a ballot in an election 
free from . . . intimidation and fraud.”38 
Rather than apply the traditional forum analysis, on appeal in PG II, the 
Third Circuit applied the experience and logic test to assess the press’s access 
to information.39 Specifically, the court considered whether the information in 
question—access to the voting process—should be available to the members of 
the press.40 By applying the experience and logic test, the court posited that 
access to government proceedings, such as the voting process, must be ana-
                                                                                                                           
 32 PG I, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 730. 
 33 See id. at 731. PG contended that, given the new strict Voter ID laws passed in Pennsylvania, 
access to the polling place was particularly necessary. See PG II, 705 F.3d at 96. It should be noted 
though, as of now, the implementation of the Voter ID laws have been suspended until ongoing litiga-
tion is decided. Id. at 96 n.5. 
 34 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3060(d) (West 2014); see PG I, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 731. Section 
3060(d) defines a “polling place” as the room provided in each election district for voting at a primary 
election. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3060(d). 
 35 See Complaint at 2, PG I, 902 F. Supp. 2d 724 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (No. 12-CV-00960-NBF). 
 36 See PG I, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 750–51. 
 37 See id.; see also PG II, 705 F.3d at 96 (discussing the trial court’s analysis). 
 38 See PG I, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 754–56. 
 39 See PG II, 705 F.3d at 102, 106; see also Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 597–98 (outlining 
when courts should employ the experience and logic test). Applying the experience and logic test to 
the voting process was a matter of first impression for the court. See PG II, 705 F.3d at 104. The court, 
however, relied on the Third Circuit’s previous applications of the experience and logic test. See id.; 
Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1174 (3d. Cir. 1986) (en banc) (reasoning that the 
experience logic test is the general analysis for evaluating the right of access to all traditionally open 
government proceedings and applying the test to certain administrative records); Publicker Indus., Inc. 
v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067–68 (3d Cir. 1984) (expanding the application of Richmond Newspapers 
beyond criminal trials to include civil trials). 
 40 See PG II, 705 F.3d at 102. 
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lyzed in the context of a proceeding’s historical and structural role.41 Noting 
the long-standing trend toward a closed electoral process and the potential for 
the press’s abuse of voters, the Third Circuit held that the right of access did 
not extend to the polling place.42 Accordingly, the court did not analyze the 
statute under strict scrutiny and thus upheld the restraint on the press’s access 
to the polling place.43 
II. DIFFERENT STANDARDS LEADING TO DIFFERENT RESULTS:  
THE THIRD AND SIXTH CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE  
RIGHT OF ACCESS TO POLLING PLACES 
In 2013, in PG II, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit applied 
the experience and logic test to the voting process, contradicting the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s previous application of a traditional forum 
analysis to the voting process in a 2004 case Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. 
Blackwell.44 An analysis of these decisions reveals how each court’s mode of 
analysis culminated in dissimilar results.45 Section A analyzes the Third Cir-
cuit’s application of the experience and logic test in PG II.46 Section B then 
explores the Sixth Circuit’s use of a traditional forum analysis in Beacon Jour-
nal.47 
A. A Balanced Approach: The Third Circuit Applies the Experience and 
Logic Test and Limits Access to the Polling Place 
Focusing on tradition and function, the Third Circuit applied the experi-
ence and logic test to evaluate the constitutionality of Section 3060(d) of the 
Pennsylvania Election Code.48 In applying the experience prong of the experi-
ence and logic test, the Third Circuit examined whether there existed a tradi-
tion of openness for the polling place and for the voting process occurring in-
side.49 Accordingly, the Third Circuit conducted a historical examination of the 
voting process, relying heavily on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in 
                                                                                                                           
 41 See id. at 106–08. According to the court, access to governmental proceedings includes access 
to information about governmental actions and decisions. See id. at 106–07. 
 42 See id. at 112. 
 43 See id. 
 44 Compare PG II, 705 F.3d 91, 108 (3d Cir. 2013) (applying the experience and logic test), with 
Beacon Journal Publ’g Co. v. Blackwell, 389 F.3d 683, 685 (6th Cir. 2004) (applying a traditional 
forum analysis). 
 45 Compare PG II, 705 F.3d at 112 (concluding that a statute restricting press access to a polling 
station did not violate the press’s right of access), with Beacon Journal, 389 F.3d at 685 (holding that 
a statute restricting press access to a polling station violated the press’s right of free speech). 
 46 See infra notes 48–62 and accompanying text. 
 47 See infra notes 63–67 and accompanying text. 
 48 See 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3060(d) (West 2014); PG II, 705 F.3d at 108. 
 49 See PG II, 705 F.3d at 108. 
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Burson v. Freeman.50 Focusing on the nation’s shift toward privacy in the poll-
ing place, the PG II court held that the historical record was insufficient to es-
tablish a presumption of openness in the voting process.51 Additionally, the 
court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires that voting be done in 
private.52 Considering all of these factors, the court held that no objective tra-
dition existed towards openness in the voting process.53 
Moreover, the Third Circuit held that the logic prong weighs against a 
constitutionally protected right of access to the voting process.54 The court 
acknowledged that openness of the voting process prevents various electoral 
problems such as fraud and intimidation.55 Where the press is already permit-
ted to be relatively close to the voting place, however, the court emphasized 
that “the benefits of additional oversight are inversely proportional to the dis-
tance of the press.”56 Thus, the court concluded that the public good would 
scarcely benefit from the press being inside the polling station, rather than sev-
eral feet away.57 
Further, the PG II court noted the fundamental dangers in open voting 
proceedings.58 First, the court emphasized the concern that granting access to 
one member of the press would require all other members of the press to share 
                                                                                                                           
 50 See id. at 108–09 (citing Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 200–06 (1992) (plurality opinion)). 
Because the experience prong is demanding, assessing relevant history is often essential. See id. at 
108. In 1992, in Burson v. Freeman, a plurality of the Court examined the history of the voting pro-
cess in America, relying on numerous historical sources, including comments made by the framers of 
the U.S. Constitution, practice at the English courts of law, congressional procedures, relevant regula-
tory schemes, and court decisions. See 504 U.S. at 200–06. The Third Circuit relies heavily on this 
historical investigation. See PG II, 705 F.3d at 109. In the colonial era, voting was conducted by voice 
vote, which was open and accessible to the public. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 200. As time progressed, 
however, the newly formed states adopted systems based on the paper ballot. See id. In the late 1800s, 
though, states began to move toward privacy in the voting process by adopting “the Australian system” of 
voting, which introduced election booths and a single ballot. See id. at 203. Thus, while the act of voting 
was originally open and accessible, a thorough examination of United States history establishes a shift 
towards a closed electoral process. See PG II, 705 F.3d at 110. 
 51 See PG II, 705 F.3d at 110. Analyzing the facts under the experience prong, the court properly 
accounted for historical trends by examining the history of the voting process and noting the trend 
away from openness, toward privacy in the voting process. See id.; see also Burson, 504 U.S. at 200–
06 (examining the historical trend towards privacy in the polling place). 
 52 PA. CONST. art. VII, § 4 (stating that “[a]ll elections by the citizens shall be by ballot or by such 
other methods as may be prescribed by law; Provided, That secrecy in voting be preserved”); see PG 
II, 705 F.3d at 110. 
 53 See PG II, 705 F.3d at 110. 
 54 See id. at 112. 
 55 Id. at 111. 
 56 Id. For example, in Pennsylvania, the press is allowed to be ten feet away from the public poll-
ing place. Id. Accordingly, the court concluded that allowing the press to be in the room would not 
significantly enhance the public good. Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 See id. at 112. 
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in that right.59 Second, if the press has a First Amendment right of access, this 
finding raises the concern of who is included as a member of the press.60 That 
is, the class of persons to whom such a right is applicable is almost limitless.61 
Accordingly, the Third Circuit held the experience and logic test militates 
against finding a right of access in the context of the voting process.62 
B. A Public Forum: The Sixth Circuit’s Traditional Framework Analysis 
Allows Access to the Polling Place 
In Beacon Journal, the Sixth Circuit held that an Ohio statute prohibiting 
access to polling places could not be constitutionally enforced against mem-
bers of the press.63 Unlike the Third Circuit, the Sixth Circuit focused on ac-
cess to a forum for speech purposes and therefore applied a traditional forum 
analysis.64 
Applying this rubric, the Beacon Journal court classified a polling place 
as a public forum and analyzed the Ohio statute under strict scrutiny.65 The 
court held that the statute did not survive strict scrutiny, as the government 
failed to show that the law was necessary to further the state’s interest in ensur-
ing orderly elections or that the law was narrowly drawn to achieve that end.66 
Consequently, the court concluded that the Section 3501.35 likely abridged the 
freedom of the press.67 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 See id. Furthermore, in evaluating the potential dangers inherent in openness, the court rea-
soned that the presence of reporters during the sign-in period could potentially “concern, intimidate or 
even turn away potential voters.” See id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 See Beacon Journal, 389 F.3d at 685. The Ohio law mandated, in part, that no person “shall be 
allowed to enter the polling place during the election, except for the purpose of voting.” OHIO. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 3501.35(B) (West 2002); see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3501.35(B)(1) (West 2014) 
(providing the current version of § 3501.35). The plaintiff—the publisher of a daily newspaper—
sought injunctive relief against the statute. See Beacon Journal, 389 F.3d at 684. The Sixth Circuit, 
vacating the trial court’s decision, ordered that the injunction be granted. See id. at 685. 
 64 See Beacon Journal, 389 F.3d at 685. In contrast, the Third Circuit in PG II focused on right of 
access for information gathering purposes. See 705 F.3d at 108 (describing the court’s analysis in 
Beacon Journal). 
 65 See Beacon Journal, 389 F.3d at 685. 
 66 See id. 
 67 See id. 
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III. PROTECTING THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO KNOW THROUGH  
A BALANCING FRAMEWORK 
The Third Circuit appropriately applied the experience and logic test in 
PG II to evaluate whether the press should have access to the voting process.68 
By utilizing the experience and logic test, the Third Circuit properly framed 
the constitutional issue as a question of right of access to information, fore-
stalled the government from potentially exploiting nonpublic fora, and protect-
ed contemporaneous First Amendment principles.69 
First, analyzing restrictions on the press’s access to polling places as a 
question of the press’s right to access information correctly characterizes the 
constitutional issue.70 Because the press’s access to a polling place involves 
access to a forum to gather news, rather than for speech, the experience and 
logic test applies to balance the government’s interest in privacy against the 
public’s interest in accessing information.71 In contrast, applying a traditional 
forum analysis—as the Sixth Circuit did in its 2004 case Beacon Journal Pub-
lishing Co. v. Blackwell—mischaracterizes the constitutional issue as the right 
of access to a forum for speech purposes rather than the right of access for in-
formation gathering purposes.72 
Second, extending the experience and logic test to the voting process pre-
vents the government from potentially engaging in systematic concealment of 
                                                                                                                           
 68 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 566, 597–98 (1980) (holding that public 
access claims should be evaluated under the experience and logic test); PG II, 705 F.3d 91, 108 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (applying the experience and logic test to the press’s right to access the voting process); 
Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1174 (3d Cir. 1986) (explaining that the experi-
ence and logic test is the general framework for examining the right to access open governmental 
proceedings). 
 69 See infra notes 70–85 and accompanying text (explaining this point in greater detail). 
 70 See PG II, 705 F.3d at 108. 
 71 See id. at 113. 
 72 See id. 108 (arguing that applying a traditional framework analysis in right of access cases 
would allow the government to “shut down nonpublic fora completely, thereby hiding any activities 
behind a veil of secrecy”); cf. Beacon Journal Publ’g Co. v. Blackwell, 389 F.3d 683, 685 (6th Cir. 
2004). The Beacon Journal court’s reliance on this forum test was incorrect because the case did not 
only involved access to a forum for newsgathering, rather than for speech. Cf. 389 F.3d at 685 (indi-
cating that the reporters were attempting to report news). This distinction becomes clear, where the 
Beacon Journal court incorrectly cites to a 1983 U.S. Supreme Court case, Perry Education Ass’n v. 
Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, as precedent. See id. at 685 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local 
Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). That particular case concerned a law regulating expressive 
activity in a public school. See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 44. Although the Sixth Circuit ex-
plained that Perry Education Association concerned the right of access to a forum for speech purpos-
es, the Beacon Journal court mischaracterized the Ohio law, which restricted access to a forum for 
newsgathering purposes. See Beacon Journal, 389 F.3d at 685; see also C. Thomas Dienes, Commen-
tary, The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 109, 109–10 (1986) (arguing that courts can use the nonpublic forum doctrine as a basis for 
denying free speech claims). 
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information.73 Applying this test promotes openness, and thereby prevents the 
government from secreting information, because it properly accounts for the 
public’s role in the process and its interest in access to the information in ques-
tion.74 By engaging in the test’s balancing inquiry, a court may consider both 
the government’s interest in keeping private what has always been private as 
well as the public’s positive role in the particular process in question.75 Indeed, 
as illustrated in PG II, even when a forum has historically remained closed to 
the public—such as a polling place—courts must still consider whether the 
public’s access to the forum positively contributes to the functioning of the 
proceeding.76 
In contrast, using the Beacon Journal court’s forum analysis to determine 
one’s right to access information enables the government to shroud its activi-
ties in secrecy.77 Because the state has the ability to create nonpublic fora, cou-
pled with the fact that statutes only need to satisfy rational basis, the state can 
thus rely on the forum analysis framework to restrict and limit access.78 Ac-
cordingly, due to the risk that a state may manipulate the forum analysis 
                                                                                                                           
 73 See PG II, 705 F.3d at 108 (“By applying the experience and logic test, [the court] ensures that 
the government cannot shroud its activities behind a veil of secrecy merely by banning everyone from 
a nonpublic forum.”); Michael Hayes, Note, Whatever Happened to ‘The Right to Know’?: Access to 
Government-Controlled Information Since Richmond Newspapers, 73 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1129 (1987) 
(arguing that the balancing test properly accounts for the public’s right of access to government-
controlled information). 
 74 Cf. PG II, 705 F.3d at 100, 113 (stating that “a traditional forum analysis for [right of access] 
cases . . . sets a dangerous precedent which permits the government too much freedom to hide their 
activities from the public’s view”); see also Hayes, supra note 73, at 1136 (explaining that a flexible 
balancing test allows courts to adapt to changes in the importance of the proceeding). 
 75 See PG II, 705 F.3d at 102, 107–08 (explaining the benefits of using the experience and logic 
test); see also Hayes, supra note 73, at 1136 (emphasizing that the balancing test is consistent with 
general First Amendment jurisprudence and avoids rewarding governmental bodies that close their 
proceedings). 
 76 See PG II, 705 F.3d at 108, 110 (“[A] showing of openness at common law is not required.” 
(quoting N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 213 (3d Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). Accordingly, although the polling place did not have a tradition of openness, the 
Third Circuit still evaluated the benefits of the public having access to the polling place. See id. at 
111–12 (evaluating the positive role that public access would play in the voting process such as an 
informed electorate and the ability to oversee new voter legislation). The experience prong also ac-
counts for historical trends in which a forum started out as public but evolved into a closed forum, 
such as the polling place. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 200–06 (1992) (examining the voting 
processes historical evolution from a public event into a private affair). 
 77 See PG II, 705 F.3d at 100; Dienes, supra note 72, at 110 (arguing that the development of the 
public forum doctrine has evolved into a device for denying open and equal access). 
 78 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001). Restrictions in a nonpub-
lic forum are only constitutionally required to be reasonable considering the forum’s purpose. See id. at 
106–07; see also Dienes, supra note 72, at 117 (observing that no government regulation of a nonpub-
lic forum has been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court). 
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framework in this way, applying the experience and logic test more fully ac-
counts for traditional First Amendment values.79 
Finally, employing the experience and logic test protects contemporane-
ous First Amendment principles.80 This is because the logic prong of the test 
accounts for the public’s positive role in the functioning of the process.81 For 
example, in PG II, the Third Circuit considered how access to the polling place 
would promote informed discussion of government affairs and allow the public 
to oversee the implementation of new voter legislation.82 In contrast, a tradi-
tional forum analysis precludes courts from assessing present day values and 
conditions.83 Under the forum rubric, regardless of the public’s involvement in 
the forum, any restriction would be evaluated via a reasonableness standard—a 
much lower constitutional benchmark.84 Thus, although the Third Circuit ulti-
mately held that the potential dangers of access outweighed the advantages, the 
experience and logic test remains as the best way to account for contemporary 
circumstances.85 
                                                                                                                           
 79 See PG II, 705 F.3d at 100; Daniel A. Farber & John E. Novak, The Misleading Nature of Pub-
lic Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 
1224 (1984) (arguing that characterizing a forum as nonpublic may cause courts to disregard how the 
challenged regulation conflicts with First Amendment values). The traditional forum analysis, in con-
trast, fails to fully account for First Amendment values, as there is not a tradition of openness in a 
nonpublic forum such as a polling place. See PG II, 705 F.3d at 100. Such First Amendment values 
include protecting expressive speech and the marketplace of ideas, the freedom of the press, and the 
right to access information. See William E. Lee, Cable Leased Access and the Conflict Among First 
Amendment Rights and First Amendment Values, 35 EMORY L.J. 563, 564–65 (1986) (discussing First 
Amendment values); Hayes, supra note 73, at 1113 (discussing the First Amendment value of the right 
to access information). 
 80 Hayes, supra note 73, at 1134 (arguing that courts which solely rely on the experience prong 
fossilize the First Amendment, which would make the right of access much more restricted than other 
First Amendment rights); see PG II, 91 F.3d at 110–11 (weighing the benefits of access to the polling 
place verses the dangers of such access, but ultimately holding that the logic prong disfavors a finding 
of a right of access in the context of voting). 
 81 See PG II, 91 F.3d at 110 (explaining the logic prong and outlining the general categories when 
determining whether the public plays a positive role in the functioning of the process). 
 82 See id. at 111–12 (demonstrating how the logic prong accounts for contemporary conditions as 
the court considered newly enacted Pennsylvania voter ID laws and the potential value of the public 
overseeing the implementation of the law). 
 83 See supra notes 16–24 and accompanying text (analyzing the traditional framework standard); 
see also PG II, 91 F.3d at 100 (explaining the risk of utilizing the forum analysis for a statute that 
restricts the press’s access to information); cf. Beacon Journal, 389 F.3d at 685 (applying a traditional 
forum analysis to evaluate a statute restricting the press’s access to information). 
 84 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106–07 (holding that restrictions in a nonpublic fora are only 
constitutionally required to be reasonable in light of a forum’s purpose); see also Dienes, supra note 72 
(observing that the U.S. Supreme Court has never ruled a government regulation of a nonpublic forum 
unconstitutional). 
 85 See PG II, 91 F.3d at 111–12. The Third Circuit emphasized this in a footnote, indicating that 
the analysis would have changed if Pennsylvania’s restrictive voter ID laws had been implemented. 
See id. at 112 n.23. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Third Circuit relied on the experience and logic test to evaluate the 
press’s right of access to the voting process. In PG Publishing Co. v. Aichele, 
the court properly framed the constitutional issue as right of access to a forum 
for information gathering purposes, rather than right of access for speech pur-
poses. In doing so, the Third Circuit disallowed access to the voting process, 
but avoided the dangerous precedent of using a traditional forum analysis to 
evaluate the right of access to information cases. Using a traditional forum 
analysis in this context would create the potential for the government to shroud 
its activities in secrecy. Unlike the traditional forum analysis, the experience 
and logic test properly accounts for present day values while considering his-
torical precedent. The test thereby accounts for both the tradition of the process 
and the public’s positive role in the functioning of the process. 
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